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Pharmaceutical Industry Funding to Patient-Advocacy
Organizations: A Cross-National Comparison of
Disclosure Codes and Regulation
BY LAURA KARAS, M.D., MPH;1 ROBIN FELDMAN, J.D.;2
GE BAI, PH.D., CPA;3 SO YEON KANG, MPH, MBA;4 AND
GERARD F. ANDERSON, PH.D.5 6
ABSTRACT
Transparency has become one of the primary themes in health care
reform efforts in the United States and across the world. In the face of
exorbitant drug prices, high levels of patient cost-sharing, and
pharmaceutical expenditures that consume a growing proportion of public
sector budgets, much attention has been drawn to the pharmaceutical
industry. Congressional investigations, academic publications, and news
articles have endeavored to reveal the extent of drug and device industry
influence on health care actors. In response, several nations, including the
United States, have passed legislation mandating disclosure of drug
company payments to physicians. In the United States, there are currently
no legal requirements for disclosure of pharmaceutical industry
sponsorship to patient-advocacy organizations by either party to the
transaction. An ongoing concern is that drug industry payments could
interfere with the objectivity of patient-advocacy groups and may induce
them to take public positions favorable to the drug industry but at odds

1. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy
and Management, Baltimore, MD.
2. Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Innovation, University of California Hastings, San Francisco, CA.
3. Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Baltimore, MD.
4. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy
and Management, Baltimore, MD.
5. Professor of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, Baltimore, MD.
6. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation.
453

454

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:2

with the interests of patients. This article provides a comparative analysis
of industry codes of practice and regulation that govern relationships
between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy organizations in
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and
Canada, with an emphasis on disclosure policies for industry sponsorship.
The article draws upon the practices of other nations and the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act to make a case for an expansion of the Sunshine
Act to patient-advocacy groups.
Keywords: Sunshine Act; patient-advocacy organizations; disclosure;
pharmaceutical industry; conflict of interest

I. INTRODUCTION
Research has identified concerns about the connection between
funding and decision-making in medical research and practice. For
example, a meta-analysis of studies demonstrated that industry-sponsored
research trials were 3.6 times more likely to reach conclusions favorable to
industry than those without industry sponsorship.7 Another study found
that physicians who received pharmaceutical industry gifts subsequently
shifted their prescribing patterns: they tended to write more prescriptions
and prescribed brand drugs more heavily.8 Likewise, concerns have been
raised about industry relationships with patient-advocacy organizations;
these groups that have faced criticism for accepting funding from the drug
industry and seemingly prioritizing industry interests above those of
patients. 9, 10, 11
While funding from industry plays an important role in ensuring
financial viability for patient-advocacy organizations, it may compromise
the independence of these organizations and create conflicts of interest.
For instance, under pressure from a Congressional investigation led by
7. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454-465 (2003).
8. Susan F. Wood et al., Influence of Pharmaceutical Marketing on Medicare
Prescriptions in the District of Columbia, 12(10) PLOS ONE, e0186060 (2017).
9. Emily Kopp & Rachel Bluth, Nonprofit Linked to PhRMA Rolls out Campaign to
Block Drug Imports, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (April 19, 2017), https://khn.org/news/nonprofit-linked-to-phrma-rolls-out-campaign-to-block-drug-imports/ (last visited June 3,
2018).
10. Ray Moynihan & Lisa Bero, Toward a Healthier Patient-advocacy Voice: More
Independence, Less Industry Funding, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 350-51 (2017).
11. GARDINER HARRIS, Drug Makers are Advocacy Groups’ Biggest Donors, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/health/22nami.html (last visited
June 4, 2018).
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Senator Charles Grassley, the National Alliance on Mental Illness
(“NAMI”) revealed that it receives nearly two-thirds of its donations from
pharmaceutical companies.12 NAMI adopted a pro-industry stance toward
FDA’s black-box warning on antidepressants, which alerts patients and
prescribers to the risk of suicide in children and adolescents, by arguing
that the warning deters treatment and that the label omits the risk of suicide
from untreated mental illness.13 A Congressional investigation led by
former Senator Claire McCaskill exposed donations by opioid
manufacturers to patient-advocacy groups such as the American Pain
Foundation; this group and others were accused of downplaying the risks of
opioid drugs and promoting opioid usage.14
A spokesperson for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (“PhRMA”), the trade association for U.S. biopharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies, has been quoted as saying that “patient
groups and biopharmaceutical companies share the same goal of improving
patient access to innovative therapies and ensuring the continued
development of new treatments and cures.”15 However, the primary goal of
any company is, and should be, to create value for its shareholders, while
the primary goal of a patient-advocacy organization is to serve its patients.
Although in many circumstances these goals are aligned, in other cases
they may be in conflict. Policymakers and the public must be able to
discern when conflicts exist.
There have been calls for increased scrutiny and transparency of
pharmaceutical industry funding to patient-advocacy organizations in the
U.S. 16, 17, 18; yet, there is currently no publicly available record, nor any
12. Grassley works for disclosure of drug company payments to medical groups,
CHUCK GRASSLEY: UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR IOWA (Dec. 8, 2009), https://www.
grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-disclosure-drug-companypayme nts-medical-groups (last visited June 4, 2018).
13. FDA Announcement on Black Box Warning Label for Antidepressants Used With
Children, THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (Oct. 15, 2004), https://www.
nami.org/Press-Media/Press-Releases/2004/FDA-Announcement-on-Black-BoxWarning-Label-for-An (last visited June 3, 2018).
14. BREAKING: Millions in Payments Among Findings of McCaskill Opioid
Investigation into Ties Between Manufacturers and Third Party Advocacy Groups, WEBSITE
OF UNITED STATES SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.mccaskill.
senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/breaking-millions-in-payments-amongfindings-of-mccaskill-opioid-investigation-into-ties-between-manufacturers-andthird-party-advocacy-groups- (last visited June 3, 2018).
15. Jayne O’Donnell, Patient-advocacy Groups Funded by Drug Companies are
Largely Mum on High Drug Prices, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2016/01/21/patient-advocacy-groups-drug-makers-high-drug-prices/790
01722 (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
16. Matthew S. McCoy et al., Conflicts of Interest for Patient-Advocacy Organizations,
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standardized disclosure required by either side of these financial
exchanges. Instead, news sources and Congressional investigations attempt
to fill the gap. In a recent report, Kaiser Health News (“KHN”) identified
over 1,200 patient-advocacy organizations in the U.S., of which nearly half
received funding from pharmaceutical companies: KHN found that 14
pharmaceutical companies gave over $116 million dollars to 594 patientadvocacy groups in 2015.19
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act requires disclosure of
payments and transfers of value from drug, device, biologic, and medical
supply manufacturers to physicians and teaching hospitals in the U.S. As
legal academic Marc Rodwin has written, “at the core of doctoring lies
tension between self-interest and faithful service to patients and the
public.”20 The same tension exists with not-for-profit organizations that
represent patients in the collective, yet must also secure income adequate to
sustain their efforts and ensure their continued existence. The Physician
Payments Sunshine Act and disclosure of contributions to patient-advocacy
organizations are based on the same principle: transparency would allow
the public and policymakers to understand the potential for conflicts of
interest and act so as to mitigate potential harm to patients and the public.
Though standardized disclosure of industry contributions to patientadvocacy organizations is absent in the U.S., this is not the case in many
other countries. Drug industry trade associations in many nations have
instituted codes of practice that establish guidelines for the interactions
between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy organizations,
including disclosure policies, and several nations have enacted legislation
to mandate disclosure. Both laws and codes of practice routinely place the
reporting burden on drug and device companies. While laws require
disclosure, codes of practice are voluntary; they rely on a company’s
willingness to comply, and enforcement of the terms of these codes for
failure to comply is not guaranteed.
This article proceeds in six sections. Section I introduces the issue of
disclosure of pharmaceutical industry funding to patient-advocacy groups.
376 NEW ENG. J. MED, 880-885 (2017).
17. Susannah L. Rose et al., Patient Advocacy Organizations, Industry Funding, and
Conflicts of Interest, 177 JAMA INTERN. MED. 344-350 (2017).
18. Norman R. Augustine et al., Making Medicines Affordable: A National Imperative,
NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCI. ENG’G & MED. 93-94 (2017).
19. Emily Kopp et al., Patient Advocacy Groups Take in Millions from Drugmakers. Is
There a Payback?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS, https://khn.org/news/patient-advocacy-groupstake-in-millions-from-drugmakers-is-there-a-payback/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2018).
20. Marc A. Rodwin, The Heart of the Matter, in CONFLICTS OF INT. AND THE FUTURE
OF MED.: THE U.S., FR, AND JAPAN, Oxford U. Press, 20-37 (2011).
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Section II provides a cross-national comparison of the laws and industry
codes of practice that govern disclosure of pharmaceutical industry
payments to patient-advocacy organizations in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Canada. Section III
compares government-mandated disclosure to voluntary self-regulation by
the drug industry and reaches the conclusion that a combination of both
mechanisms may be most fitting to address industry sponsorship of patientadvocacy organizations. Section IV draws lessons from the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act to make recommendations for disclosure policy
relating to payments and transfers of value to patient-advocacy
organizations in the U.S. Section V extends the discussion to professional
medical associations, and the final section offers concluding remarks.

II. A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF
DISCLOSURE CODES AND REGULATION
We conducted a qualitative comparison of the pharmaceutical trade
association codes of practice and government regulations guiding industry
relationships with patient-advocacy groups in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and Canada. The nations were
purposively chosen to be illustrative of the advancements of pertinent
national industry codes and regulations. The European supranational code
put forth by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations (“EFPIA”) was also examined for provisions applicable to
relationships with patient-advocacy organizations. Based on the content of
the codes, we established a 17-point checklist of common principles
relating to financial and non-financial disclosure and other governing
principles of interactions with patient-advocacy organizations, and
subsequently scored each code according to the presence or absence of
these principles (Table 1). The discussion that follows provides greater
detail on the substance of each code, as well as relevant national law and
regulation relating to disclosure of industry support to patient-advocacy
organizations. This article does not consider industry sponsorship of
patient assistance programs, which provide financial assistance to
qualifying patients for the purchase of pharmaceutical drugs.

A. United States
There is currently no federal legislation mandating disclosure of drug
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company funding to patient-advocacy organizations, other than regulations
related to filing a citizen petition at the FDA21 (that regulation only requires
disclosure of a party who directly funds the particular petition filed). The
Physician Payments Sunshine Act, passed in 2010 as part of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires disclosure of payments and
transfers of value from drug, device, biologic, and medical supply
manufacturers to physicians and teaching hospitals (“Covered Recipients”),
but not to patient-advocacy organizations.
Beginning in 2014,
manufacturers that have at least one product reimbursed by Medicare or
Medicaid must disclose these payments on a public website — the Open
Payments database.22
Senators Herb Kohl and Chuck Grassley first introduced the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act in 200723 after Senate investigations revealed that
researchers at major universities failed to disclose millions of dollars of
pharmaceutical industry payments, sometimes while holding investments in
the companies they were funded to study.24 Physicians were frequent
recipients of sponsorship from the drug and device industry, which took
various forms including monetary payments for consultation services, paid
speaking arrangements, grants, gifts, free meals, paid travel expenses and
other perks.25, 26 A study published in the New England Journal of
Medicine in 2007 found that 94 percent of physicians accepted some form
of financial or non-financial “benefits” from industry.27
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act sought to cast a public light on
payments and inducements to physicians, which could compromise their

21. Robin Feldman & Rabiah Oral, Comments, FDA Public Meeting on Hatch Waxman
Amendments: Ensuring a Balance Between Innovation and Access (Sept. 18, 2017).
22. Medicare, Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Transparency Reports
and Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 27 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402, 403).
23. Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2007, S. 2029, 110th Cong. (2007).
24. Let the Sunshine in: Implementing the Physician Payments Sunshine Act:
Roundtable before the S. Special Committee on Aging, 112th Congress, Second Session
(2012).
25. Grassley works to disclose financial ties between drug companies and doctors,
CHUCK GRASSLEY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR IOWA (Jan. 22, 2009), https://www.
grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-disclose-financial-tiesbetween-drug-companies-and-doctors (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
26. Paid to Prescribe?: Exploring the Relationship between Doctors and the Drug
Industry: Hearing before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. (2007),
https://www.aging.senate.gov/hearings/paid-to-prescribe-exploring-the-relationshipbetwe en-doctors-and-the-drug-industry (last visited Mar. 16, 2018).
27. Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of Physician-industry Relationships, 356
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742-50 (2007).
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independence and could influence prescribing practices in favor of more
expensive brand drugs. The Act mandates disclosure of the amount and
form of the payment or transfer of value, the date it is provided, the name
and address of the recipient, and a description of the nature of the
payment.28 The Act also contains a requirement for disclosure of
ownership or investment interests held by physicians or their immediate
family members in a covered manufacturer or group purchasing
organization (“GPO”).
Corporate integrity agreements (“CIAs”) between pharmaceutical
companies and the U.S. Office of Inspector General often mandate a level
of reporting that exceeds that required by the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act. For example, a CIA may obligate a pharmaceutical company to
disclose the monetary value and recipients of philanthropic grants,
fundraising contributions, or other sponsorship provided to non-profit
organizations, including patient-advocacy groups and professional
societies.29 The reporting obligations under CIAs may explain disclosure
of funding to patient-advocacy groups by some U.S. pharmaceutical
companies, rather than voluntary rigor in transparency practices. The
durability of disclosure reporting prompted by a CIA is questionable, as the
agreement typically lasts for five years, after which a company may choose
to discontinue disclosure practices not required by law.
Recently, proposed legislation has sought to place payments to patient
groups within the scope of required reporting under the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act. Following an investigation led by Senator
McCaskill’s office which revealed that opioid manufacturers, including
Purdue Pharma, gave over eight million dollars from 2012 to 2017 to
fourteen “outside working groups” on opioid-related issues,30 Senator
McCaskill introduced the “Patient Advocacy Transparency Act” (S.3000,
115th Cong.) in June of 2018. This bill would amend the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act to require reporting of certain forms of industry
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat.
119, 689 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)).
29. Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Off. of Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of
Health and Human Services & Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, Off. of Inspector
Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents (effective Sept. 29, 2010, updated Mar. 15,
2018), https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/cia-documents.asp#n
(last visited July 5, 2018).
30. Fueling an Epidemic, Report Two, Exposing the Financial Ties between Opioid
Manufacturers and Third Party Advocacy Groups, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs (Ranking member’s office), https://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/media/minority-media/breaking-millions-in-payments-among-findings-ofmcc
askill-opioid-investigation-into-ties-between-manufacturers-and-third-partyadvocacy-gr oups- (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
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sponsorship to patient groups, professional societies, and providers of
continuing medical education. No further Congressional action has been
taken on S.3000, and it remains to be seen whether it will face headwinds
from industry or funding recipients.
In response to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, some warned of
a dampening effect on innovation resulting from fewer physician-industry
relationships31 32 - it was argued that physicians who received payments
would be unfairly stigmatized and would avoid engaging with drug and
device companies. Since the benefits resulting from physician-industry
collaboration would not be concomitantly measured and presented, the
Open Payments database could present a picture of industry influence that
is unfairly skewed. From this response, we anticipate that the reaction to
mandatory reporting of payments to patient-advocacy groups may highlight
the many benefits and synergies resulting from their partnerships with
industry. Disclosure of funding, however, need not lead to a decrease in
funding, and transparency will encourage greater emphasis on ethical
boundaries.
In the U.S., PhRMA has established a code entitled “Principles on
Interactions with Patient Organizations.” It states that pharmaceutical
companies must respect the independence of patient-advocacy
organizations and may provide financial support for activities that are
primarily “professional, educational, or scientific in nature.”33 There is no
requirement or recommendation for public disclosure of industry funding to
these organizations.34 As will be shown below, this stands in contrast to
the codes of practice that pharmaceutical trade associations of many other
developed nations have established.
With respect to disclosure by patient-advocacy organizations
themselves, no mandatory reporting of company-level funding exists in the
United States. While dual disclosure may seem redundant, it can
31. Thomas Sullivan, Physician Payment Sunshine Act: Radiologists Concerned with
Potential Mischaracterizations of Relationships with Industry. POL’Y & MED. (May 6,
2018),
https://www.policymed.com/2013/10/physician-payment-sunshine-actradiologists-concerned-with-potential-mischaracterizations-of-relationships-withindustry.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2018).
32. Thomas Sullivan, Physician Payment Sunshine: Media Missing the Mark – This
Could be Sunset for Innovation, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018),
https://www.policymed.com/ 2012/01/physician-payment-sunshine-media-missing-themark-this-could-be-sunset-for-innovation.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2018).
33. PhRMA Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations, PHRMA WEBSITE,
http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_principles_paper_20120919_
final.pdf
(last visited July 3, 2018).
34. Id.
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accomplish different purposes and have different effects. It is the view of
the authors that both forms of disclosure are necessary to properly address
the conflict of interest inherent in the exchange between the two parties.
The National Health Council (“NHC”), an umbrella organization for U.S.
“health-related organizations,” has over fifty member patient-advocacy
organizations (also referred to as voluntary health agencies).35 The NHC
recently implemented a Standards of Excellence Certification Program
consisting of thirty-eight standards that deal with “governance, human
resources, programs, fundraising, finance, accounting and reporting, and
evaluation.” Standard 31, which pertains to corporate relationships,
requires:
disclosure of the name of the individual corporation identified on
Schedule B of its Form 990 (more than the greater of $5,000 or
2% of the total amount of contributions reported on line 1H of
Part VIII of Form 990) and the aggregate amount of support
provided by each corporation OR the total amount of corporate
support from pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device
companies as a percentage of total organizational revenue
[emphasis added].36
This standard permits a patient-advocacy organization to circumvent
disclosure of company-specific support, and indeed many US patientadvocacy organizations do not disclose the specific amounts provided to
them from particular pharmaceutical companies; rather, they provide an
aggregate value for total corporate sponsorship. While individual patientadvocacy organizations can choose to address the issue of disclosure of
corporate sponsorship through internal policies, such policies are not
common; in a survey based on a random sample of patient-advocacy
organizations, only one-quarter (73 of 284 patient-advocacy organizations
surveyed) reported having disclosure policies for public reporting of
industry financial relationships.37 A study of disclosure information
featured on national and international patient-advocacy organization
websites found that only a fraction (7 of 37) of the patient-advocacy
organizations with annual reports included corporate donations, and of
those, none provided the level of detail necessary to ascertain

35. NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL: MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY, http://www.nationalhealth
council.org/about-nhc/membership-directory (last visited July 3, 2018).
36. NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL: Standards of Excellence Certification Program for
Voluntary Health Agencies (January 2017), http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/NHC_Files/Governance/Full_Standards_of_Excellence.pdf
(last
visited July 3, 2018).
37. See supra note 17.
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pharmaceutical company-level funding.38 Website disclosures were not
always consistent with annual reports, and none of the websites examined
in the study indicated the proportion of a patient-advocacy group’s total
income obtained from pharmaceutical companies.39

B. Europe
The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations (“EFPIA”), which consists of national pharmaceutical
industry trade associations from thirty-three European countries40 and forty
member pharmaceutical companies (both full members and member
affiliates),41 has put forth codes that govern relationships with health care
entities.
The Code of Practice on Relationships between the
Pharmaceutical Industry and Patient Organizations, hereafter referred to as
the EFPIA Patient Organization Code, contains provisions that apply
specifically to interactions with patient-advocacy groups,42 including a
prohibition on the requirement of single-company funding of a patientadvocacy organization (Article 7) and the requirement of a written
agreement for financial support and significant non-financial support to
patient-advocacy organizations (Article 2). It also requires annual
disclosure of a list of all patient-advocacy organizations to which a
company provides support, the monetary value of the support and invoiced
costs, and an account of the nature of the support “that is sufficiently
complete to enable the average reader to form an understanding of the
significance of the support” (Article 5).43
The EFPIA Patient Organization Code requires written approval for a
pharmaceutical company’s use of a patient-advocacy organization’s logo or
proprietary material (Article 3) and prohibits companies from shaping a
38. Douglas E. Ball, Klara Tisocki, & Andrew Herxheimer, Advertising and Disclosure
of Funding on Patient-advocacy Organisation Websites: A Cross-sectional Survey, 6 BMC
PUB. HEALTH 201 (2006).
39. Id.
40. EFPIA Disclosure Code: Frequently asked questions, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.),
http://www.esmo.org/Policy/EFPIA-Disclosure-Code/Frequently-AskedQuestions#eztoc9 58298_0_1_6 (last visited May 14, 2018).
41. EFPIA Corporate Members, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/aboutus/membership (last visited May 14, 2018).
42. EFPIA Code of Practice on Relationships Between the Pharmaceutical Industry
and Patient Organisations, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/
media/24310/3c_efpia-code-of-practice-on-relationships-pharmapluspt-orgs.pdf (last
visited Apr. 9, 2018).
43. Id.
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patient-advocacy organization’s written materials to further their
commercial interests (Article 4).
The EFPIA Patient Organization Code, along with the EFPIA Code on
Disclosure of Transfers of Value from Pharmaceutical Companies to
Healthcare Professionals and Healthcare Organizations (hereafter referred
to as the “EFPIA Disclosure Code”),44 establish minimum standards for
disclosure. However, they do not exempt companies from abiding by more
rigorous national laws or codes. National EFPIA member associations, not
EFPIA itself, retain the responsibility to impose sanctions on member
companies that violate relevant code or law.45 The EFPIA Patient
Organization Code requires that member trade associations establish a
complaint procedure and a national body to manage complaints.46

1. United Kingdom
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (“ABPI”)
issued the most recent version of its Code of Practice for the
Pharmaceutical Industry in 2016. The ABPI Code of Practice is a
comprehensive set of guidelines and standards outlining appropriate
relationships between pharmaceutical companies and other groups,
including patient-advocacy organizations. Clause 27.7 of the ABPI Code
echoes the EFPIA Patient Organization Code: all member companies must
disclose annually to the public a listing of patient-advocacy organizations
to which they provide “financial support and/or significant indirect/nonfinancial support,” along with a “description of the nature of the support
that is sufficiently complete to enable the average reader to form an
understanding of the significance of the support,” and disclosure of the
monetary or non-monetary value of the support.47 The Code allows for
optional reporting of the patient-advocacy organization’s total income and
the percentage of total income attributable to pharmaceutical company
donation.
Companies must report a listing of patient-advocacy

44. EFPIA HCP/HCO Disclosure Code, WEBSITE OF EFPIA (Eur.), https://www.
efpia.eu/media/25837/efpia-disclosure-code.pdf (last visited May 14, 2018).
45. See supra note 40.
46. EFPIA Code of Practice on Relationships between the Pharmaceutical Industry and
Patient-advocacy Organizations, Annex II: Implementation and Procedure Rules, WEBSITE
OF EFPIA, (Eur.), https://www.efpia.eu/media/24310/3c_efpia-code-of-practice-onrelation ships-pharmapluspt-orgs.pdf (last visited May 14, 2018).
47. ABPI Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry (2016) (U.K.),
http://www.pmcpa.org.uk/thecode/Documents/Code%20of%20Practice%202016%20.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2018).

464

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:2

organizations that they have engaged for contracted services, such as
speaking arrangements, consulting services, or involvement in advisory
board meetings (Clause 27.8), including the total amount paid to each
patient-advocacy organization over the reporting period.48
The ABPI Code of Practice also requires that pharmaceutical
companies establish written agreements with patient-advocacy
organizations, including provisions governing engagements for consulting
or other services, but does not require that such agreements be made public.
Other provisions prohibit a company from requiring that it serve as the
singular source of financial support for a patient-advocacy organization
(Clause 27.4); require written agreements for public use of a patientadvocacy organization’s logo or other proprietary materials (Clause 27.5);
and prohibit the utilization of a patient-advocacy organization’s materials
to advance a pharmaceutical company’s commercial interests (Clause
27.6).49 ABPI currently has over 60 full members,50 which supply ninety
percent of the pharmaceuticals consumed by the National Health Service.51
The organization maintains a centralized database, Disclosure UK,52
accessible from its website, which provides a listing of charitable donations
searchable by health care organization and pharmaceutical company.
The ABPI Code of Practice does not impose monetary fines or
penalties for non-disclosure. Rather, companies must demonstrate that they
are taking steps to correct a breach and comply with the code. “Serious
cases” may result in sanctions, including but not limited to an audit of
company procedures, submission of a corrective statement, public
reprimand, and suspension or exclusion from membership in ABPI.53

2. Germany
The German regulatory body for pharmaceutical companies, FSA
(“Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle für die Arzneimittelindustrie e.V.,” or
“Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry”) has fifty-five
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. ABPI Members List, WEBSITE OF ABPI (U.K.), https://www.abpi.org.uk/
membership/abpi-members-list/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
51. See supra note 47.
52. Disclosure UK, ABPI WEBSITE (U.K.), https://abp-euags.emea.crm.cegedim.c
om/AggregateSpend360/Posting/ExpenseReport.aspx?postedreporttype=pCctRQJCLQc%3
D&reportID=fzQi4WVhSqKCaerpJbCgxg%3D%3D&Language=NyRIIBaAuMY9s3bTmU
SGXQW6yEjsGDHz&DataValue=qWE1R12&LCID=2057 (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
53. See supra note 47.
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member companies54 that control roughly seventy-five percent of the
pharmaceutical market in Germany.55 FSA promulgates a “Code of
Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient Organizations” and a
“Transparency Code” that detail requirements for disclosure of
pharmaceutical company sponsorship to health care entities, including
physicians, patient-advocacy organizations, and medical institutions. The
FSA Board of Arbitration may impose monetary fines for code violations.56
The FSA Code of Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient
Organizations contains many principles in common with other codes,
including the need to respect the “neutrality and independence” of patientadvocacy organizations (Section 6) and a ban on member companies from
serving as the exclusive supporter of a patient-advocacy organization or
any of its activities (Section 16).57 The involvement of pharmaceutical
companies in patient-advocacy organization-sponsored events must be
carried out in a “balanced and objective” manner that allows for competing
or alternative information to be presented (Section 6). Written agreements
are required for collaboration between member companies and patientadvocacy organizations (Section 11) and for contracted services, which are
restricted to health care-related services only (Section 12). The promotion
or recommendation of specific prescription-only pharmaceuticals is
prohibited (Section 9).
The FSA Code contains several notable provisions absent from other
codes; one is the prohibition on member companies from establishing
patient-advocacy organizations (Section 7), and a prohibition on employees
or representatives of member companies from acting “in any capacity” for
patient-advocacy organizations and specifically, exclusion of company
representatives and employees from serving on executive bodies of patientadvocacy organizations, other than scientific advisory boards (Section 7).
Another provision unique to the code is the prohibition of websites
operated jointly by patient-advocacy organizations and pharmaceutical
companies, and a ban on links to member company websites from the

54. FSA Members: At a Glance, WEBSITE OF FSA (2016) (Ger.), https://www.fsapharma.de/der-fsa/auf-einen-blick/ (last visited May 6, 2018).
55. Transparency Code: The Second Year, WEBSITE OF FSA (June 21, 2017) (Ger.),
https://www.pharma-transparenz.de/service/aktuelles/mitteilung/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ne
ws%5D=157&cHash=212e1799fad23b65080cdeeb14d64756 (last visited May 6, 2018).
56. Ten Facts about the Transparency Code, WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.),
https://www.pharma-transparenz.de/fachkreisangehoerige/zehn-fakten-zum-transparenzko
dex/ (last visited May 6, 2018)
57. FSA Code of Conduct on the Collaboration with Patient-Advocacy Organizations,
WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.), https://www.fsa-pharma.de/fileadmin/Downloads/Pdf_s/
Kodizes__Empfehlungen/Code_of_Conduct_PORG.pdf. (last visited May 21, 2018).
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websites of patient-advocacy organizations (Section 9).
With respect to public disclosures, the FSA Code requires annual
reporting to the public of all patient-advocacy organizations that a member
company supports through financial or “significant indirect or nonfinancial benefits,” including a requirement to report the “total amount of
monetary benefits and donations in kind per calendar year and patientadvocacy organization,” or a description of benefits if non-monetary
(Section 15). FSA maintains a public database of such sponsorship,
searchable by pharmaceutical company and by patient organization.58
The umbrella organization for patient-advocacy groups in Germany,
BAG SELBSTHILFE, promotes disclosure by patient-advocacy
organizations. In 2016, it established an online listing of member groups
that have dedicated a portion of their homepage to transparency of the
group’s sponsorship (the “Transparency List”).59

3. France
In 2009, the diabetes drug and off-label weight loss agent Benfluorex
(trade name “Mediator”) was removed from the market in France after
resulting in the death of an estimated 2,000 persons due to cardiac
complications.60, 61 The drug’s maker, Servier, was alleged to have
concealed Mediator’s safety risks from the French health regulator while
promoting the drug’s off-label use for weight-loss.62 Servier was also
alleged to have made payments to individuals with ties to the French
authorities, including a former French health minister, in order to keep
Mediator on the market well after other nations had removed it. In May of
2013, France signed into law the historic “Loi Bertrand” (also referred to as

58. Benefits of Member Companies to Patient Organizations for the Year 2017,
WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.), https://www.fsa-pharma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/
zuwendungen-intern/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
59. Grants from Business Enterprises (Transparency List), BAG SELBSTHILFE
(Ger.), https://www.bag-selbsthilfe.de/informationsportal-selbsthilfe-aktive/unabhaengigk
eit-der-selbsthilfe/zuwendungen-von-wirtschaftsunternehmen-transparenzliste/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2018).
60. France’s Servier to Face Trial over Mediator Weight-loss Drug, REUTERS (Sept. 5,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-drugs-mediator/frances-servier-to-facetrial-over-mediator-weight-loss-drug-idUSKCN1BG2G2 (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
61. Scott Sayare, Scandal over Mediator, a French Weight-loss Drug, Prompts Call for
Wide Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/health/
scandal-widens-over-french-weight-loss-drug-mediator.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
62. Owen Dyer, France to prosecute its drug regulator and Servier in scandal over
diabetes drug, j4231 BMJ 358 (2017).
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the French Sunshine Act) in the spirit of the Physician Payments Sunshine
Act and as a response to the Mediator scandal.
A wider range of companies are responsible for disclosure under the
French Sunshine Act than under U.S. law, including not only
manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologics, and medical supplies, but also
makers of cosmetics, contact lenses, health software, and biomaterials. The
French Sunshine Act requires disclosure of benefits to a much more
expansive set of stakeholders, including medical students and trainees,
nurses, midwives, pharmacists, and dieticians, as well as professional
medical societies, “associations of users of the health system” (including
patient-advocacy organizations), media publishing companies, and
prescription and dispensing software companies.63, 64, 65
France maintains an online database (La base de données publique
transparence – Santé), updated biannually and searchable by company, that
contains information on direct and indirect benefits, the date the exchange
was made, and the monetary value (with a minimum threshold for
disclosure of ten euros).66 A 2016 decree expanded the scope to include the
monetary value of contracted services.67 Knowing failure to comply may
result in fines, and disclosure must conform with French data privacy laws.
Les Entreprises du Médicament (“LEEM”), the French pharmaceutical
trade association and an EFPIA member, issued a code, Dispositions
Déontologiques Professionnelles,68 that includes a section concerning
relationships with patient-advocacy organizations. The code contains many
of the same provisions as the EFPIA Patient Organization Code.
LEEM has over 260 member companies.69 CODEEM (le Comité de
déontovigilance) enforces the LEEM Code through its Litigation and
63. Quinn Grundy et al., Decoding disclosure: Comparing conflict of interest policy
among the United States, France, and Australia, 122 HEALTH POL’Y 509-518 (2018).
64. Cristiana Spontoni, Françoise Labrousse & Armelle Sandrin-Deforge, French
Sunshine Obligations Clarified and Extended, Jones Day, LEXOLOGY, Jan. 25, 2017,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54ec76ab-51f6-4a66-b4cd-a86fa765c418
(last visited May 22, 2018).
65. Loi N° 2011-2012 Du 29 Décembre 2011 Relative Au Renforcement De La
Sécurité Sanitaire Du Médicament Et Des Produits De Santé. 2011, Légifrance: Paris,
France.
66. Base Transparence Santé, https://www.transparence.sante.gouv.fr/flow/main?ex
ecution=e1s1 (last visited May 22, 2018).
67. See supra note 63.
68. Dispositions Deontologiques Professionnelles, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT
(Jan. 12, 2016) (Fr.), https://www.leem.org/sites/default/files/DDP%20ApplicablesAu12%20janv%202016_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018).
69. Who is LEEM? LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT (Fr.), https://www.leem.org
/sites/default/files/Who%20is%20LeemtradLeem.org__0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018).
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Sanctions Commission,70 which may institute sanctions on member
companies for noncompliance, including a warning with or without a
request for corrective measure, publicized warnings if corrective measures
are not implemented, and suspension or cancellation of membership in
LEEM “in case of serious breach or repeated failure.”71 The LEEM code
also contains a complaint procedure.

C. Australia
Medicines Australia, the trade association that represents
pharmaceutical companies in Australia, promulgates a Code of Conduct
that contains guidelines for interactions with patient-advocacy
organizations, as well as transparency reporting requirements relating to
patient-advocacy organization funding from industry. 72 The Medicines
Australia Code of Conduct very closely resembles the language of the
EFPIA Patient Organization Code, though Medicines Australia is not
within the jurisdiction of EFPIA.
Every member pharmaceutical company must provide a list of patientadvocacy organizations to which it provides “financial support and/or
significant direct / indirect non-financial support.” 73 The major difference
as compared to the EFPIA reporting practice is the use of a standardized
tabular format for reporting.74 Rather than allowing each company to
report on its own website, Medicines Australia maintains a centralized
listing75 of the reports of all member pharmaceutical companies, which is
updated annually.
The Medicines Australia Code contains the stipulation common to
many other codes that “no company may request that it be the sole funder
of a health consumer organization or any of its major programs.”76 The
70. CODEEM, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT (Fr.), https://www.leem.org/codeemle-comite-de-deontovigilance (last visited May 22, 2018).
71. Dispositions Deontologiques Professionnelles, LES ENTREPRISES DU MÉDICAMENT,
(January 12, 2016) (Fr), https://www.leem.org/sites/default/files/DDP%20ApplicablesAu12%20janv%202016_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018).
72. Med.’s Austl. Code of Conduct Edition 18, WEBSITE OF MED.’S AUSTL. (2014),
https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct-current-edition/
(last
visited May 22, 2018).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Member Company Reports, WEBSITE OF MED’S. AUSTL., https://medicine
saustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/transparency-reporting/health-consumer-organisationsupport-reports/member-company-reports/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
76. See supra note 72.
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code proceeds to clarify that “this would not preclude a company who is
the only supplier of a prescription product for a specific condition or
disease from sponsoring a health consumer organization or any of its
programs (14.1).”77
Medicines Australia currently has over forty member companies in
various categories of membership.78 The Code of Conduct Committee may
impose sanctions for breaches of the code, which may include an order to
terminate improper conduct, issuance of a corrective action, and imposition
of a monetary fine according to a detailed schedule.79

D. Canada
Innovative Medicines Canada (formerly Canada’s Research-based
Pharmaceutical Companies), a pharmaceutical trade association with over
45 member companies,80 first issued “Guidelines for Transparency in
Stakeholder Funding” in 2009 as an annex to its Code of Ethical Practices.
“Guidelines for Transparency in Stakeholder Funding” enumerates seven
principles and eight guidelines to manage relationships with various
stakeholders, including patient-advocacy organizations.81 Contained within
the principles are statements promoting the independence and integrity of
stakeholders and the need for “transparent funding relationships.”82 The
guidelines articulated in the document prohibit the use of stakeholder
relationships to promote prescription medicines; require a written
agreement with details of direct funding to stakeholders; and require
member companies to report “a list of all stakeholders to which they
provide direct funding” at regular intervals on their websites or annual
reports.83 However, there is no requirement or recommendation that
member companies disclose the value of financial payments or nonfinancial transfers to individual stakeholders such as patient-advocacy

77. Id.
78. Our Members, MED’S AUSTL WEBSITE, https://medicinesaustralia.com.au/aboutus/our-members/ (last visited May 22, 2018).
79. See supra note 72.
80. Member Companies, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/
about/member-companies/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
81. Our History, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/about/ourhistory/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
82. Guidelines for Transparency in Stakeholder Funding, Annex A to the Code of
Ethical Practices (2018) INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovativemedicines.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Code-Formatted_Regular_EN-2.pdf (last visited July 5, 2018).
83. Id.
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organizations. Innovative Medicines Canada maintains a complaint process
and imposes monetary penalties, as well as public reporting on its website,
in cases of violations of the Code of Ethical Practices.84
In June 2017, ten member companies of Innovative Medicines Canada
agreed to voluntarily disclose an aggregate value for three categories of
payments: (1) payments for the services of Canadian health care
professionals; (2) payments made to health care organizations; and (3)
payments to Canadian health care professionals to cover the cost of travel
to meetings.85 These aggregate disclosures do not include details of
organization-specific or provider-specific funding.
In December 2017, Ontario passed the Health Sector Payment
Transparency Act that mandates annual reporting of transfers of value to
health care professionals and a wide array of parties within the health care
sector, including patient-advocacy organizations, foundations, and
charitable groups.86, 87, 88 The parties responsible for reporting (“payors”)
include not only drug and device manufacturers, but also wholesalers,
distributors, marketing firms, and organizers of continuing medical
education.89 According to the draft regulations, payors are obligated to
report value transfers made to a lengthy list of recipients, including
common recipients (hospitals and health care providers), as well as many
other allied health employees and organizations (advocacy groups, longterm care providers, colleges and universities, researchers, students,
immediate family members of these recipients, and any person who is
employed as a “board member, director, trustee, officer, appointee,
employee, or agent of the above,” among others).90

84. Id.
85. Voluntary Disclosure of Payments, INNOVATIVE MED’S CAN., http://innovati
vemedicines.ca/ethics/voluntary-disclosure-of-payments/ (last visited July 5, 2018).
86. Thomas Sullivan, Ontario Open Payments: Proposed Rule for the Health Sector
Payment Transparency Act, POL’Y MED. (Updated May 4, 2018), http://www.policy
med.com/2018/03/ontario-open-payments-proposed-rule-for-the-health-sector-paymenttransparency-act.html (last visited July 5, 2018).
87. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 2 (Can.).
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/17h25?_ga=2.265956687.1189033580.15249575221335467172.1524957522#BK1 (last visited July 5, 2018).
88. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Proposed new regulation made under the
Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, (Can.), http://www.ontariocanada.
com/registry/showAttachment.do?postingId=26846&attachmentId=37128 (last visited April
28, 2018).
89. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 3
(Can.).
90. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, Consultation Draft (Can.),
http://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/showAttachment.do?postingId=26846&attachmentI
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Under the Ontario law, companies are required to report the dollar
value of the transfer, the nature of the transfer (cash or cash-equivalent, inkind item or service, etc.) and the category to which a transfer belongs
(charitable donation, research, travel and accommodation, operational
support, etc.). Reporting will take place electronically, with public
disclosure on a website operated by the Minister of Health and Long-Term
Care. The Health Sector Payment Transparency Act allows for the
imposition of fines on individuals and on corporations for failure to
comply.91 The legislation places no reporting obligations on recipients of
pharmaceutical industry funding.

E. How do These Countries Score on the 17-point Checklist of
Common Principles and Governance Rating Scale?
As presented in Table 1, the U.S. scores the lowest (3 points), Canada
scores 9 points, and all other countries score greater than 10 points on the
17-point checklist of common principles. Compared to the other countries
examined here, the U.S. received the lowest score due to the absence from
the PhRMA “Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations” of most
principles contained in other codes. Of the seventeen common principles
identified, the PhRMA code contains only three: a statement regarding the
independence of patient-advocacy organizations, a statement that no
company should require that it be a patient-advocacy organization’s sole
funder, and a requirement for written documentation of support.
A commonality among the industry codes with the exception of
PhRMA’s “Principles on Interactions with Patient Organizations” is the
prohibition on advertising prescription pharmaceutical drugs to the public.
Direct-to-consumer advertising, legally permissible in the U.S., is a key
factor that distinguishes the U.S. from the other nations considered in our
analysis. Direct-to-consumer advertising may contribute to industry
reluctance to reveal payments to patient organizations in the U.S., since
payments may help support direct-to-consumer marketing tactics that walk
a fine line between promotional and non-promotional messaging to
patients. The potential influence of patient-advocacy organizations’
industry funding on direct-to-consumer advertising to patient-members is
beyond the scope of our analysis here but represents an important area for
further research.

d=37129 (last visited July 5, 2018).
91. Health Sector Payment Transparency Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 25, Sched. 4, s. 17
(Can.).
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Each country’s code of conduct and relevant law were examined for
the presence of three governance principles: (1) whether code or law
requires public disclosure of industry funding to patient-advocacy
organizations; (2) whether code or law requires disclosure on a centralized
website; and (3) whether code or law imposes monetary penalties for nondisclosure. (Only monetary penalties were considered here since they
represent a more stringent repercussion for non-compliance than nonmonetary penalties.) Table 2 presents the findings. A country receives a 0,
1, 2, or 3 depending on the number of governance principles present.
Australia, Germany, France, and Canada (taking into account the recently
passed Health Sector Payment Transparency Act in Ontario) all achieved a
3 out of 3 rating, signifying intensive disclosure governance. Of note,
France and Canada have legislative requirements for disclosure. The
United Kingdom achieved a 2 out of 3 rating, in light of the fact that
financial penalties are not imposed for non-disclosure. The United States
earned a 0 out of 3 rating, given that no mandatory disclosure is in place,
there is no centralized disclosure venue, and there are no monetary
penalties for non-compliance established in code or law. Taking the results
from Tables 1 and 2 together, the U.S. lacks rigorous principles guiding
pharmaceutical company interactions with patient-advocacy organizations,
including disclosure policies for drug industry funding to these
organizations, a feature that stands in contrast to the other industrialized
nations considered here.

III. MANDATORY REGULATION VS. VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION
The chief obstacle to the effectiveness of a voluntary code of conduct,
and thus the main justification for a legislative solution, is compliance. For
example, a company could claim to conform with a trade association code
of practice while not actually revealing every payment made to a patientadvocacy organization. A trade association that promulgates a code may
not actually impose the sanctions set out in the code for failure to comply.
Even if sanctions are imposed, they may not be severe enough to deter
unethical behavior, or companies that desire to conceal payments may
simply accept a sanction as a cost of doing business.
Voluntary codes, as opposed to law, are typically not administered by
an independent agency that can ensure accountability and verify the
accuracy of reported data through independent audits. Self-government
creates disincentives to expose noncompliance or wrongdoing of members.
The disinclination of governing bodies to enforce their own ethical codes
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has been referred to as “the conflict within conflict of interest laws.”92 The
unwillingness of a trade association to expose its own members’ violations
could render the codes impotent. Independent audits of pharmaceutical
company disclosures conducted at regular intervals may serve as a check
on misleading or incomplete reporting.
There is a risk that companies will employ voluntary reporting for
public relations purposes,93, 94 limiting the usefulness of the reports as a
mechanism for accountability. The implementation of a standardized
national disclosure regime according to law or regulation would reduce the
ability of corporations to fashion their disclosures for a public relations
advantage.
Other sectors have wrestled with the issue of mandatory regulation
versus voluntary corporate self-regulation, especially vis-à-vis policies
pertaining to safety and the natural environment. A study of U.S. chemical
companies that adopted a voluntary environmental, health, and safety code
— the Responsible Care program — noted that the code established
“metastandards” that outlined broad goals while placing the process or
mechanism to achieve those goals at the discretion of each company. This
strategy allowed for flexibility but also led to heterogeneity in
implementation practices, which was more prominent for internal practices
than for external, public-facing practices.95 In keeping with this example,
public-facing disclosure practices may be more likely to converge on
uniform standards, which largely corresponds to what has occurred among
the international codes of practice for interactions with patient-advocacy
organizations, with the notable exception of the United States where
disclosure is not recommended or required. Notwithstanding a tendency
toward convergence of standards, discrepancies in disclosure practices
across nations and the complete absence of a disclosure policy in the
United States give way to inconsistency and obfuscation.
Of course, government regulation and industry self-regulation are not
mutually exclusive. A combination of both mechanisms may be most
effective in achieving both disclosure and conflict of interest management.
92. R.M. Rhodes, Enforcement of Legislative Ethics: Conflict within the Conflict of
Interest Laws, 3 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 373-406 (1973).
93. Deborah Doane, Market Failure: The Case for Mandatory Social and
Environmental Reporting, NEW ECON. FOUND. (March 2002), http://thomas.reverdy.free.fr/
Envt%20Reporting.pdf.
94. Dara O’Rourke, Opportunities and Obstacles for Social Responsibility Reporting in
Developing Countries, THE WORLD BANK (March 2004), https://nature.berkeley.edu/
orourke/PDF/CSR-Reporting.pdf.
95. Jennifer Howard, Jennifer Nash, & John Ehrenfeld, Standard or Smokescreen?
Implementation of a Voluntary Environmental Code, 42 CA MGMT. REV. 63-82 (2000).

474

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:2

Industry codes of conduct go far beyond disclosure, as was illustrated in
Section II, and include many other broad principles to guide ethical
interactions with patient-advocacy organizations.
Disclosure, and
enforcement of disclosure, may be best accomplished through law or
government regulation, while industry codes of conduct and patientadvocacy organization codes of ethics may provide the necessary
scaffolding for conflict of interest management once enforceable disclosure
policy is in place.

IV. LESSONS FROM THE SUNSHINE ACT FOR PATIENT-ADVOCACY
ORGANIZATIONS
In this section, we use the Physician Payments Sunshine Act as a
guide to make suggestions for key features of transparency legislation that
could be designed to regulate the disclosure of industry funding to patientadvocacy organizations in the U.S.

A. Who Should Report?
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act places reporting obligations
and penalties for non-disclosure unilaterally on drug, device, biologic, or
medical supply companies.96 However, it is unclear if industry is the most
fitting party to disclose funding to patient-advocacy organizations. On one
hand, legal systems may choose to place burdens on the party most likely
to have the relevant information and the ability to comply. “Applicable
manufacturers,” the term that defines the companies covered by the
Physician Payments Sunshine Act’s reporting requirements, currently have
the infrastructure to meet data collection and reporting requirements.97
There may be minimal added burden on companies to utilize this
infrastructure to report payments to patient-advocacy organizations. On the
other hand, since patient-advocacy organizations stand to benefit
substantially from these payments, as a matter of fairness, one could argue
that they should share accountability for proper reporting. Unlike
individual physicians, patient organizations are entities that have boards of
directors and already have record-keeping and reporting obligations related
to maintaining their status as tax-exempt organizations under Section
501(c)(3) of the Federal Tax Code.

96. Physician Payments Sunshine Act, 42 C.F.R. § 403.904(a-b) 2010.
97. Id. § 403.902.
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Moreover, unless a patient-advocacy organization is required to
provide data on its sources of income from industry, policymakers will not
know the extent of their dependency on industry. As noted by the
Physician Payments Sunshine Act’s prime sponsor, Senator Chuck
Grassley (R-IA), “[t]ransparency fosters accountability, and the public has
a right to know about financial relationships. . . The goal of our legislation
is to lay it all out, make the information available for everyone to see, and
let people make their own judgments about what the relationships mean or
don’t mean.”98 By analogy, disclosure of payments to patient-advocacy
organizations would allow the public to weigh any potential bias on the
part of those receiving the funds. From that perspective, the information
should be available directly from the organization receiving the funds,
based on the theory that someone examining the organization would look at
the organization itself.
Either legislative or regulatory changes could provide the legal
mechanism to achieve transparency of drug company funding to patientadvocacy groups. As one of the authors has noted in public comments to
the FDA, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act could be amended to
include patient-advocacy groups in the definition of “Covered Recipients”
— as the Patient Advocacy Transparency bill proposes — and to require
reporting by patient groups as well as by drug companies.99 Alternatively,
the FDA could require that every patient-advocacy group participating in a
public forum meet certain disclosure requirements. The FDA citizen
petition regulations already require disclosure of value transfers related to
writing the petition and penalize non-disclosure with civil money penalties.
These regulations could be expanded to include identification of all thirdparties that fund a patient-advocacy group in general, not just those who
sponsor a particular petition.

B. What Should be Reported?
It is useful to report the monetary value of charitable donations and
payments to a patient-advocacy organization, but a more instructive metric
is the payment amount relative to the total income of the organization.
Disclosure of this metric is best accomplished through mandatory reporting
by patient-advocacy organizations. Although it is inappropriate to require
public disclosure of a physician’s income, public disclosure of a patientadvocacy organization’s income is already required within 990 forms
98. See supra note 25.
99. See supra note 21.
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submitted to the Internal Revenue Service.
Additional reporting
requirements for company-specific funding and the accompanying
proportion of a patient-advocacy organization’s total income derived from
each company could be added to the existing forms, along with a
requirement to provide the same information on a central website.

C. Accessibility to the Public
A public database, analogous to Open Payments, that is easily
searchable by pharmaceutical company and by patient-advocacy
organization, would provide the fullest picture of industry support. A
single company’s donations could be viewed through the database, as well
as a patient-advocacy organization’s sources of pharmaceutical industry
funding. This would fulfill two of the key purposes of disclosure:
achievement of the public’s right to know, and creation of a tool for
informed decision-making.

D. Sanctions for Inaccurate Reporting and Failure to Comply
The full extent to which pharmaceutical trade associations in other
nations impose sanctions on companies that fail to report, in accordance
with the terms of their codes of practice, is unknown. In the U.S., the
Physician Payments Sunshine Act allows for civil monetary penalties on
manufacturers and GPOs “that fail to timely, accurately or completely
report the information required” by the Act, and imposes greater penalties
for intentional failure to report.100 It is reasonable that manufacturers
would face similar penalties for failure to report funding to patientadvocacy organizations. As with trade association codes, however,
sanctions have power only to the extent that they are enforced, and
governing bodies must have the will to carry out the sanctions set out in the
regulation.

E. Disclosure as a Starting Point for Conflict of Interest
Management
The existence of a financial relationship between industry and a
patient-advocacy organization does not imply wrongdoing, and we do not
100. Physician Payment Sunshine Act, Penalties for Failure to Report, 42 C.F.R.
§403.912.
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espouse putting an end to financial contributions. Standardized national
reporting will help foster public trust between patients and the
organizations that serve them.
Similar to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, other financial
disclosure laws in the United States have been passed in the aftermath of
scandals and government investigations that attracted public attention and
aroused public ire. For example, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978
was passed after the Watergate scandal and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 was enacted following prominent accounting scandals involving
WorldCom, Enron, and other companies. For both of these landmark
pieces of legislation, financial disclosure was viewed as a necessary step
toward repairing public trust. Academic papers and news articles placing a
spotlight on payments to patient-advocacy groups have contributed to
declining public confidence in the independence of these organizations. In
this climate, financial disclosure can bolster public trust in patientadvocacy groups, but it runs the risk of having a trivial impact without
concurrent efforts to address conflicts of interest.
Disclosure should fit within a larger strategy of conflict of interest
management that includes elements such as exclusion of pharmaceutical
company employees from participation in the boards of patient-advocacy
organizations, in the vein of the German FSA Code of Conduct; strict
prohibition on pharmaceutical company marketing, including the posting of
logos, specific drug names, or other drug advertisements, at patientadvocacy organization events or in an organization’s materials; and a
prohibition on involvement of pharmaceutical companies in the
development or editing of a patient-advocacy organization’s educational
materials (a provision that is present in the majority of the trade association
codes considered here, but not in that of PhRMA). Patients and family
members who belong to patient-advocacy groups should be informed of the
existence of online funding disclosure reports and should be encouraged to
review them. Maintaining the independence and integrity of patientadvocacy groups by ensuring separation from the drug company and its
interests should be the principal aim of conflict of interest management.

V. THE NEXT FRONTIER: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY FUNDING
TO PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS
Similar to patient-advocacy organizations, professional medical
associations have no legal obligation to disclose corporate funding sources
in the U.S. Industry funding to these associations is common, yet
organizational policies to manage conflicts of interest are inconsistent, and
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in some cases, inadequate.101, 102 For example, the American Academy of
Family Physicians (“AAFP”), the main professional organization in the
United States for family medicine doctors, attracted criticism and lost
physician members after it established a “Consumer Alliance” with the
Coca-Cola Company to fund a joint obesity education program and
consumer education website. 103, 104, 105 According to the AAFP, the
alliance with Coca-Cola offered “evidence-based information on sugary
beverages, sweeteners, and healthy living benefits,”106 but many rebuked
the professional body for accepting money from a company that has a
vested interest in the sale of sugary beverages and for sending a dangerous
message that sugary beverages should be part of a healthy diet.
Industry funding to professional medical associations has the potential
to imperil the fiduciary duty that those organizations and their physicianmembers owe patients. Some have called upon professional medical
associations to divest themselves of corporate financial ties.107 Other
recommendations include capping the percentage of a professional medical
association’s operating budget that may be derived from industry donation,
disqualifying those who receive industry support from participating in the
development of clinical practice guidelines, and requiring physician
leadership of professional societies to have no financial connections to
industry.108 Some have suggested a “central repository” for industry
donations to professional medical associations and to academic medical
centers for continuing medical education,109, 110 from which funds could be
101. David J. Rothman et al., Professional Medical Associations and Their Relationships
with Industry: A Proposal for Controlling Conflict of Interest, 301 JAMA 1367-1372
(2009).
102. Howard Brody, Professional Medical Organizations and Commercial Conflicts of
Interest: Ethical Issues, 8 ANNALS FAM. MED. 354-358 (2010).
103. Id.
104. John G. Spangler, Family Medicine’s Sweet Tooth – for Money, ABC NEWS (Nov.
16, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/coke-partnership-aafp-angers-doctors/
story?id=9079376 (last visited May 16, 2018).
105. Marion Nestle, Family Doctors Resign from AAFP over Coke Partnership, FOOD
POL. (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.foodpolitics.com/2009/10/family-doctors-resign-fromaafp-over-coke-partnership/ (last visited May 16, 2018).
106. AAFP, Coca-Cola End Consumer Alliance Agreement, WEBSITE OF AAFP (June 26,
2015), https://www.aafp.org/news/inside-aafp/20150626tccc.html (last visited May 16,
2018).
107. See supra note 102.
108. David J. Rothman, Professional Medical Associations and Divestiture from
Industry: An Ethical Imperative for Pain Society Leadership, 17 PAIN MED. 218-219 (2016).
109. See supra note 101.
110. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices that Create Conflicts of
Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429-433 (2006).
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doled out without attribution to any particular donor company. While these
strategies place distance between industry sponsors and particular
activities, they do not eliminate the potential for influence and may not
provide the recipients with the degree of autonomy they promise.
A professional medical association is essentially an aggregate of
individual physicians. Since industry payments to physicians must be
disclosed publicly pursuant to the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, so
should payments provided to a collective of physicians. This is especially
important since a collective organization wields more influence over
prescribing patterns than any individual doctor ever could. Furthermore,
the inclusion of teaching hospitals within the statutorily defined “Covered
Recipients” sets a precedent for disclosure by entities, not just by
individuals, which paves the way for an expansion of the Physician
Payments Sunshine Act to professional medical associations and patientadvocacy organizations.

VI. CONCLUSION
No standardized disclosure exists in the United States for financial
exchanges between pharmaceutical companies and patient-advocacy
organizations, while trade association codes in other nations obligate such
disclosure. The lack of transparency in the United States introduces doubt
and mistrust in the public mind and leaves room for malfeasance. To
address the gap, the U.S. could expand the scope of the Physician Payments
Sunshine Act, and it may be prudent to place reporting obligations on
patient groups as well as pharmaceutical companies. Standardized and
vigilantly enforced disclosure policies along with rigorous conflict of
interest management can help these entities remain faithful to their
purposes.
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Table 1. Principles contained in pharmaceutical trade association
codes governing relationships with patient organizations. (X indicates
the presence of that principle in the code.)
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Notes:
1: “The pharmaceutical industry is in favor of patient associations being
funded by multiple sources.”
2. “To the greatest extent practicable, a Member should not be the
exclusive funder of a stakeholder organization.”
3. Left to the discretion of member associations.
4. As per the Bertrand Act.
5. As per the Commonwealth Therapeutic Goods Legislation.
6. Not specifically for patient organizations; only stated for healthcare
providers (HCPs) or administrative staff.
7. A complaint form is accessible from the FSA website.
8. “Members should refrain from creating patient groups whose sole
purpose is to further market access in an area of therapeutic interest.”
9. Exception for participation in scientific advisory boards.
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Table 2. A comparison of key features of transparency reporting.

Notes:
1. Includes national pharmaceutical industry associations from 33
European countries.
2. EFPIA Code on Disclosure of Transfers of Value from Pharmaceutical
Companies to Healthcare Professionals and Healthcare Organizations,
WEBSITE OF EFPIA, http://www.efpia-e4ethics.eu/usd/e4ethics.n
sf/_/65E5C4055CA73D5BC125806E004713C6/%24File/FARMA_12
9399.pdf.
3. Disclosure UK, ABPI WEBSITE, (Fr.), https://www.abpi.org.uk/
ethics/ethical-responsibility/disclosure-uk/.
4. Member Company Reports, WEBSITE OF MED’S AUSTRL, https://medic
inesaustralia.com.au/code-of-conduct/transparency-reporting/healthconsumer-organisation-support-reports/member-company-reports/.
5. Transparency List, WEBSITE OF FSA (Ger.) https://www.fsa-phar
ma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/transparenzliste-2017/.
6. Benefits of Member Companies to Patient Organizations for the Year
2017, WEBSITE OF FSA WEBSITE (Ger.), https://www.fsapharma.de/bezugsgruppen/patientenorganisation/zuwendungen-intern/.
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7. La base de données publique Transparence – Santé, Ministère des
Solidarités et de la Santé (Fr.),
https://www.transparence.sante.gouv.fr/.
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